Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, 74, and Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) supremo Lalu Prasad, 77, have been at the forefront of Bihar politics for nearly five decades. Their shared journey began as comrades in the Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) Movement of the 1970s, advocating against the Emergency and championing socialist ideals. Over the years, their paths diverged, rejoined, and repeatedly reshaped Bihar’s political landscape — often as rivals, sometimes as partners in government, but always as dominant figures. Together, they have held power in the State, either directly or through significant influence, for the better part of three decades, cultivating a distinct political culture that continues to define Bihar’s identity.
Today, the advancing age and declining health of both leaders have gradually pushed them to the periphery of active politics, though Mr. Kumar still holds the Chief Minister’s office. The Bihar Assembly election this year is anticipated to be the last in which both Mr. Kumar and Mr. Prasad play central roles. Their approaching exit signifies more than just two aging leaders stepping away from the limelight; it marks the culmination of a political era they profoundly shaped. The subsequent chapter in Bihar’s political narrative promises not merely a change of faces, but a fundamental shift, the outcome of which—whether progressive or challenging—remains to be seen.
Mr. Kumar and Mr. Prasad have already begun transferring control of their respective parties, though the lines of command are not always clear. Tejashwi Prasad Yadav is Mr. Prasad’s designated political successor for the RJD, but internal family dynamics show that his siblings are not easily ceding the mantle. Tejashwi’s elder brother, Tej Pratap Yadav, has launched his own political outfit, the Jan Shakti Janata Dal. Meanwhile, sisters Misa Bharti, a sitting Member of Parliament, and Rohini Acharya, who famously donated a kidney to their father in 2022, have both expressed reservations about the growing influence of Tejashwi’s political adviser, Sanjay Yadav.
While Mr. Kumar serves as Chief Minister, there’s a growing sentiment among observers that he may no longer be firmly in control. His public statements and behavior have led many to speculate that he is grappling with dementia. Much like the public perception of the United States presidency under Joe Biden, critical decisions in Bihar appear to be made, yet the identity of the ultimate decision-maker remains elusive.
The intricate dance of conflicts and alliances between these two pivotal figures over the last half-century in Bihar also featured a crucial third supporting actor: Ramvilas Paswan, who sadly passed away just before the 2020 Assembly elections. This triumvirate—Lalu, Nitish, and Ramvilas—represented the diverse threads of subaltern politics in Bihar, which they not only embodied but actively forged. What began as a broad category of ‘backwards’—encompassing all non-upper caste Hindus, and more specifically, the middle castes excluding Scheduled Castes and savarnas (upper castes)—eventually fragmented as the aspirations of various segments diverged. We will delve deeper into this social dynamic of Bihar politics from a long-term perspective shortly, but first, let’s take a brief look at the current political landscape and key facts of Bihar.
The ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) is led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Janata Dal (United), with allies including the Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas), Hindustani Awam Morcha (Jitan Ram Manjhi), and Rashtriya Lok Morcha (Upendra Kushwaha). The opposition Mahagathbandhan—the Bihar contingent of the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) bloc—features the RJD and the Indian National Congress as primary partners, supported by Left parties (Communist Party of India – Marxist–Leninist, Communist Party of India, Communist Party of India – Marxist), Vikassheel Insaan Party (Mukesh Sahani), and Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (Hemant Soren).
Beyond these two major alliances, at least two other significant players could influence the outcome of this year’s elections: the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), led by Hyderabad-based Asaduddin Owaisi, and Jan Suraaj, the political initiative spearheaded by Prashant Kishor, a former adviser to Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Caste calculus
Mr. Kumar has served as Chief Minister of Bihar since 2005. Over his 15 years in the top office, he has partnered with the BJP for nine years and with the Congress and RJD for six, across two separate terms. He has demonstrated a remarkable ability to switch alliances, moving seamlessly from one to another without needing extensive explanations. This political flexibility has become a hallmark of his career, ensuring his continued longevity in power; however, there is a deeper sociological underpinning to this pattern.
While Mr. Kumar’s frequent alliance changes might appear as opportunism to external observers, his core constituency of Extremely Backward Class (EBC) voters interprets this as an essential ability to safeguard their interests within power-sharing negotiations, both with national parties and with the dominant Other Backward Class (OBC) group of Yadavs, primarily represented by the RJD.
According to a comprehensive community survey conducted by the State government in 2023, Bihar’s population is approximately 82% Hindu and 17.7% Muslim. Among the Hindu population, upper castes account for 15.52%, comprising Brahmins (3.66%), Bhumihars (2.87%), Rajputs (3.45%), and Kayasths (0.6%). Nearly one-fifth of the population consists of Dalits (Scheduled Castes), with Paswans (Dushadhs), the most dominant among them, making up 5.31% of the total population. The middle castes of Bihar are categorized under two annexures: Annexure 1, commonly known as EBCs, constitutes 36.01% of the population, while Annexure 2, the Other Backward Castes (OBCs), accounts for 27.12%.
Across most of India, caste and religion significantly influence political outcomes, though with varying degrees of intensity. Bihar, however, serves as a stark and compelling laboratory for this social engineering in politics. Nearly every seemingly secular issue, from unemployment and housing to infrastructure development, can be linked to a caste or religious identity much more closely in Bihar than the national average. This deep-rooted connection allows analysts to frequently reduce Bihar’s political trends to a series of permutations and combinations of caste and religious identities. While seemingly reductionist, this analytical framework often proves remarkably accurate in predicting political behavior.
In hindsight, the celebrated Jayaprakash Narayan Movement of the early 1970s in Bihar should be viewed through this critical caste lens. Historically, the Congress party in Bihar drew its primary support from the upper caste and Dalit Hindus, along with Muslims. The middle castes, however, felt largely marginalized from the Congress power structure. Jayaprakash Narayan, a Kayasth (a community with disproportionately high representation in the bureaucracy despite its small numerical strength), found instant resonance for his arguments against Indira Gandhi among middle-caste youths. It was this groundswell that fueled the rise of the ‘pichde jati’ politics championed by Nitish and Lalu, transforming it into a formidable force in State politics.
Within the broader category of backward castes, three groups—Yadavs, Kurmis, and Koeris, collectively known as the Triveni Sangh—had been leading the social and political charge in Bihar for several decades prior. Their initial demands in the 1920s often involved Sanskritising practices, such as seeking the right to wear the sacred thread, a symbol of the twice-born in the Hindu caste hierarchy. Despite some early electoral gains, the real breakthrough for Bihar’s OBC politics occurred with the fracturing of the traditional Muslim and upper caste support base of the Congress in the late 1980s. The upper castes shifted their allegiance to the BJP, while Muslims abandoned the Congress for the Janata Dal between 1989 and 1992, coinciding with the peak of the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation. The Congress subsequently collapsed and has struggled to recover, though it now hopes to stage a comeback on the back of evolving societal dynamics in Bihar.
The ‘backwards’, or ‘pichde’, a coalition that included Dalits under the banner of the umbrella Janata Party and later the Janata Dal during Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh’s tenure in the late 1980s, began to splinter soon after gaining power in Bihar. The Kurmis, led by Nitish Kumar, were among the first to break away, followed by the Paswans under Ramvilas Paswan. The remaining factions largely stayed with Lalu Prasad and his dominant Yadav community, forming the RJD. As Yadav dominance within the party and the broader state power structure expanded under the RJD, other castes grew increasingly restive.
Caste groups with the capacity to establish their own political parties mobilized accordingly. Mukesh Sahani’s Vikassheel Insaan Party (VIP) brought together the Mallah or Nishad communities—traditional boatmen and fisherfolk—who are classified under the EBC category. Upendra Kushwaha’s Rashtriya Lok Morcha (RLM) successfully carved out the Kushwaha community as a distinct political bloc, shifting alliances between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress over the years. Jitan Ram Manjhi, once so deeply trusted by Mr. Kumar that he was chosen to temporarily hold the Chief Minister’s seat during one of Mr. Kumar’s political maneuvers, later founded the Hindustani Awam Morcha (HAM) to represent the Musahar, a prominent Dalit community.
Mr. Kumar’s consistent success thus far has stemmed from his ability to retain the loyalty of the residual backward and extremely backward communities under his Janata Dal (United) platform. Currently, this model largely endures, yet it faces a distinct challenge—not primarily from the RJD, but from the two national parties: the BJP and the Congress.
At present, Mr. Kumar commands the loyalty of the remaining Other Backward Class (OBC) and EBC groups, which largely explains the limited outcry of anti-incumbency in the State despite his three terms in power (excluding the brief interim period with Mr. Manjhi at the helm). The Congress–RJD alliance has strategically attempted to highlight youth unemployment as a paramount concern, pointing to significant mass migration from Bihar due to a lack of local job opportunities. The Congress’s “Naukri Do, Palayan Roko Yatra” (Give Jobs, Stop Migration) campaign and the RJD’s promises of job guarantees are central pillars of their electoral strategy. Allegations of “vote chori” (vote theft) and manipulation of electoral rolls (SIR) are also frequently raised by the Congress–RJD combine.
In response, the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has launched a significant new initiative: the Mukhyamantri Mahila Rojgar Yojana. This scheme aims to promote self-employment among women by providing ₹10,000 each to 75 lakh women. The ₹7,500 crore program is designed to empower women through entrepreneurial ventures across various sectors, including agriculture, tailoring, and handicrafts, offering further support of up to ₹2 lakh for eligible projects. Although named after the Chief Minister, the program was prominently launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, underscoring its national political significance.
While all political parties are actively pushing the boundaries of caste and social justice politics by offering increasingly tailored benefits along those lines, there is also a discernible effort to harness the potential of other identity categories. The conspicuous focus on women and youth as universal, secular demographics is evident in the gender-centric and youth-oriented promises made by various parties. Prashant Kishor, a Brahmin who lacks a traditional caste-based constituency, is also attempting to build a political platform around secular issues such as the need for better schools, qualified teachers, and improved healthcare infrastructure, particularly in rural areas.
Although one might encounter widespread dissatisfaction against the BJP and JD(U) regarding issues like unemployment, corruption, and governance, these discussions, for now, appear unlikely to transcend deeply entrenched caste loyalties and significantly alter voting patterns in the immediate term.
Nevertheless, this remains the most significant potential outcome of the Bihar Assembly election in 2025: the emergence of a post-Mandal political landscape. In 2020, the BJP secured a 20 percent vote share, five points more than its ally JD(U), which garnered 15 percent. The RJD achieved 23 percent, and the Congress nine percent. Once Mr. Kumar and Mr. Prasad are no longer actively involved in politics, the electorate currently under their influence could become more fluid and open to exploring new political alternatives.
The Congress, for its part, hopes that its renewed emphasis on social justice politics will make it more appealing to OBCs and EBCs in Bihar. Simultaneously, it believes that governance-focused considerations, detached from traditional caste loyalties, could also work in its favor. The BJP, meanwhile, aims to leverage a blend of Hindu consolidation—which often seeks to transcend caste divisions—while also providing greater representation for OBCs and EBCs in its electoral strategies and offering a range of welfare schemes.
The precise nature and character of a post-Mandal politics in Bihar remain uncertain, but the initial indicators of this significant shift will undoubtedly become visible in the results of this year’s Assembly polls.