More than a year prior to a civil court issuing an ex-parte injunction that prevented journalists from publishing or distributing allegedly unverified and defamatory content about Adani Enterprises, the Supreme Court had already expressed significant concerns regarding the widespread recognition of ‘SLAPP’ (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) suits by various courts.
As defined in a May 2024 judgment by a three-judge Bench led by then Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud, ‘SLAPP’ refers to ‘Strategic Litigation against Public Participation’.
The Bench warned in the Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited and others versus Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited case that SLAPPs are ‘an umbrella term used to refer to litigation predominantly initiated by entities that wield immense economic power against members of the media or civil society, to prevent the public from knowing about or participating in important affairs in the public interest.’ They further stressed that courts must consider ‘the realities of prolonged trials’ and ‘the potential of using prolonged litigation to prevent free speech and public participation’ when issuing temporary injunctions in defamation cases.
The highest court emphasized a crucial point: pre-trial, ex-parte injunctions from courts effectively deliver a ‘death sentence to material sought to be published, well before the allegations have been proven.’
On Thursday, September 18, 2025, District Judge Ashish Aggarwal overturned the civil court’s ex-parte injunction order from September 6, noting that the journalists involved were not afforded a fair chance to present their side.
Through numerous past judgments, the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that safeguarding journalistic expression is a ‘constitutional mandate’ and that ‘courts must tread cautiously while granting pre-trial interim injunctions.’
Chief Justice Chandrachud, the author of the Bloomberg judgment, referred to the ‘Bonnard standard’ from the Court of Appeal (England and Wales). This standard stipulates that interim injunctions in defamation cases should only be issued in ‘exceptional situations,’ highlighting that such gag orders impact not only journalists but also the public’s fundamental right to information.
In 2024, the Supreme Court firmly stated: ‘In essence, the grant of a pre-trial injunction against the publication of an article may have severe ramifications on the right to freedom of speech of the author and the public’s right to know. An injunction, particularly ex-parte, should not be granted without establishing that the content sought to be restricted is ‘malicious’ or ‘palpably false’. Granting interim injunctions, before the trial commences, in a cavalier manner results in the stifling of public debate.’
The highest court also established a three-pronged test for trial judges to consider before issuing interim injunctions: first, a prima facie case of defamation must be established; second, the balance of convenience must favor the injunction; and third, publication must cause irreparable loss or harm. However, the 2024 judgment specifically cautioned courts against applying this test rigidly, especially when dealing with journalistic works.