The Supreme Court has cast serious doubt on the constitutional integrity of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. In a notable decision, the court quashed multiple First Information Reports (FIRs) against officials of a private university accused of facilitating illegal religious conversions. Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra pointed out that certain provisions of the law, particularly those concerning pre- and post-conversion declarations, could be overly burdensome and represent an excessive state involvement in personal matters of faith and privacy.
While the court clarified that it was not making a definitive ruling on the Act’s overall constitutional validity in this particular case, it emphasized that these issues could not be ignored when addressing criminal proceedings. The bench’s observations came during the adjudication of cases against the vice-chancellor and director of Sam Higginbottom University of Agriculture, Technology and Sciences (SHUATS), who faced charges under the 2021 law. The court ultimately set aside the FIRs, making extensive comments on how the law interacts with fundamental rights.
The court cautioned that the mandatory state inquiries and public disclosure requirements for conversion cases could impose significant procedural hurdles on individuals wishing to change their faith. Furthermore, it warned that allowing third parties to initiate prosecutions could transform the criminal justice system into a tool for harassment, potentially leading to frivolous litigation and undermining guaranteed personal liberties and religious freedoms.
Specifically, the court highlighted concerns with Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, which govern the procedures for making declarations before and after a religious conversion. These sections mandate that individuals intending to convert must declare their intentions to the authorities at least 60 days in advance, with religious converters needing to provide a one-month notice. Following this, the authorities are required to conduct a police inquiry to ascertain the “real intention, purpose and cause” of the proposed conversion. The Act also includes provisions for publicizing converts’ personal details and imposes penalties for procedural violations, along with significant sanctions for organizations found non-compliant.
The court noted that such requirements, including the publicizing of personal details and mandatory police inquiries, might need closer scrutiny to ensure they align with the constitutional framework of privacy. Drawing upon established legal precedents, including the landmark KS Puttaswamy (2017) judgment, the court reiterated that the freedom of conscience and the choice of faith are integral to the right to privacy and personal autonomy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Decisions recognizing personal autonomy in matters of marriage and partner choice were also cited to underscore that deeply personal decisions are protected from excessive state interference.
The judgment noted that the Act’s pre- and post-conversion formalities appear to infringe upon this protected sphere, as Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees not only the freedom to believe but also the freedom to express or not express that belief. The court also referred to prior rulings that uphold personal autonomy in significant life choices, stressing that such intimate decisions are shielded from intrusive state control.
In a separate development, another bench of the Supreme Court is currently examining petitions challenging similar ‘freedom of religion’ laws enacted in several other Indian states. These petitions argue that such statutes are arbitrary and infringe upon fundamental rights, including the freedom to convert and exercise free will.
The specific criminal cases against the SHUATS officials stemmed from allegations of forced conversions. The court quashed the FIRs and related proceedings, citing a critical legal flaw: the complaints were initiated by individuals not authorized under the original provisions of the UP Act at the time of the alleged offenses. While Section 4 of the Act was later amended to broaden the scope of who could file complaints, the court ruled that this amendment was not applicable retroactively to the cases at hand.
The court also rejected the Attorney General’s argument that general criminal provisions should supersede the specific procedures outlined in the UP Act. It firmly stated that when a legislature enacts a special and more stringent procedure, that specific provision must be given its intended weight and cannot be diluted. The court emphasized that the declaration requirement in Section 4 was not a mere procedural formality but a substantive part of the law.
Furthermore, the bench observed that subsequent FIRs and renewed investigations seemed driven by vested interests, aiming to perpetuate investigations against the same individuals. Finding the gathered evidence unconvincing and lacking in bona fides, the court decided to quash the cases.
The judgment concluded by affirming the maintainability of writ petitions under Article 32 for enforcing fundamental rights in such exceptional circumstances and ordered the quashing of the challenged FIRs and all subsequent proceedings.