India’s crude oil imports from Russia experienced a significant uptick in the first half of October, marking a reversal of the three-month decline observed from July to September. This surge comes as Indian refineries ramp up their operations to full capacity, driven by the festive season’s heightened demand, according to recent ship tracking data.
Previously, imports from Russia had decreased from a peak of over 2 million barrels per day in June to 1.6 million bpd by September.
However, early October tanker tracking data indicates a robust rebound. Shipments of Urals and other Russian crude grades to India have accelerated, fueled by attractive new discounts and flexible shipping arrangements, particularly as demand in Western markets remains subdued.
Preliminary figures from global trade analytics firm Kpler reveal that October imports are hovering around 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd), representing an increase of approximately 250,000 bpd compared to the previous month. It’s worth noting that this data is subject to further revision.
This data covers the period before U.S. President Donald Trump’s October 15 statement, where he alleged that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had consented to halt Russian crude imports. However, Randhir Jaiswal, spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs, clarified that he had no knowledge of any such phone conversation.
‘Pressure Tactics’ and India’s Stance
Sumit Ritolia, Lead Research Analyst for Refining & Modelling at Kpler, suggests that Mr. Trump’s assertion was likely a strategic move related to ongoing trade negotiations, rather than an indication of an impending shift in India’s policy. He emphasized that “Russian barrels remain deeply embedded in India’s energy system for economic, contractual, and strategic reasons.”
Indian refiners have also confirmed that they have not received any governmental directive to cease importing Russian oil.
India began acquiring discounted Russian oil following the imposition of Western sanctions on Moscow and the shunning of its supplies due to the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This led to a dramatic increase in Russia’s share of India’s total oil imports, soaring from a mere 1.7% in 2019-20 (FY20) to 40% in 2023-24, establishing Russia as India’s primary oil supplier.
This status as the top supplier continued for Russia through the first half of October. During this period, Iraq ranked as India’s second-largest crude oil supplier at approximately 1.01 million bpd, followed by Saudi Arabia at 830,000 bpd. Notably, the U.S. surpassed the UAE to become India’s fourth-largest supplier, providing 647,000 bpd, while the UAE supplied 394,000 bpd, as per Kpler data.
Why Russian Oil Remains Crucial for India
Ritolia emphasized that Russian crude oil remains fundamentally indispensable for India, constituting roughly 34% of its total imports. The significant discounts offered are simply too appealing for Indian refiners to overlook.
He explained that the recent downturn in imports from July to September was largely due to seasonal factors, specifically heightened maintenance operations at Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) refineries like MRPL, CPCL, and BORL, rather than concerns over tariffs.
Indeed, the majority of contracts for deliveries extending into early September were finalized 6–10 weeks prior, effectively locking in deals before July 31. Therefore, the observed dips during July-September were primarily a consequence of reduced crude processing by refineries adhering to maintenance schedules.
Despite discounts being less substantial than those seen in 2023, Russian crude continues to be among the most cost-effective feedstock choices for Indian refiners. This is attributed to advantageous landed discounts and the impressive Gross Product Worth (GPW) margins yielded by grades like Urals.
Currently, these discounts average between $3.5 to $5 per barrel, a notable increase from the $1.5 to $2 range observed in July and August.
Replacing Russian crude is not technically challenging, as India could source more barrels from traditional suppliers in the Middle East, Latin America, and the U.S., much like its crude oil portfolio prior to 2022.
Given that Indian refineries are equipped to process a wide variety of crude grades, technical constraints for such a shift are minimal.
However, the analyst questioned New Delhi’s willingness to implement such a change, stating, “The reality is that significantly reducing Russian imports would be a difficult, costly, and risky endeavor.”
Any large-scale substitution would necessitate quickly scaling up supplies from various alternative sources, which would incur higher costs, including increased freight charges and less favorable discounts. Should refinery margins shrink or retail fuel prices escalate, India could face inflationary pressures, public discontent, and reduced profitability for its refineries.
He suggests that refiners are unlikely to forgo economic advantages unless explicitly instructed by the government, akin to past directives concerning Iranian oil. While there is a growing impetus for diversification, contracts for Russian crude are usually established 6–10 weeks prior to arrival, making a swift overhaul impractical. In essence, Indian refiners are progressively expanding their procurement options, not as an immediate replacement for Russia, but to bolster overall energy security, ensure supply continuity, and increase flexibility.
India has consistently maintained an independent foreign and energy policy, carefully balancing its economic interests with diplomatic ties. A sudden departure from Russian crude would jeopardize its energy security framework and is improbable unless more stringent, formal sanctions—comparable to those imposed on Iran or Venezuela—are enacted.
He concluded that “at this juncture, it is unlikely that India will impose structural reductions solely to placate political pressure from the US and EU.” Should Washington increase its demands, Indian refiners might implement a symbolic cut of 100,000-200,000 bpd to showcase diversification and satisfy Western allies. Nevertheless, such reductions would likely be more symbolic than genuinely transformative.
While increasing imports from the U.S. to mollify Trump is a possibility, the potential volume is capped at approximately 400,000-500,000 bpd. This limitation arises from logistical drawbacks, economic considerations, and compatibility issues that U.S. crude grades present for Indian refining systems.
Kpler data indicates that Indian imports of U.S. crude have averaged 310,000 bpd in 2025 to date, an increase from 199,000 bpd in 2024, with October projected to reach a yearly high of approximately 500,000 bpd.