American officials were confident almost two years ago that Vietnam was on the verge of purchasing C-130 military transport planes from the United States. This deal, they believed, would be a significant setback for Russia, Vietnam’s primary military supplier, and a clear indicator that key geopolitical nations like Vietnam were leaning towards Washington, not Moscow or Beijing.
Last December, at Vietnam’s defense expo, the country’s prime minister even boarded a visiting C-130, meticulously inspecting its cockpit while American commanders observed. A video seemed to show a Vietnamese deputy defense minister mentioning an order for three, or possibly thirteen, planes. Yet, the anticipated acquisition never materialized.
Instead, Vietnam has intensified its procurement of Russian military hardware, skillfully navigating around US sanctions imposed due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Leaked documents and numerous interviews with Vietnamese and Western officials confirm a revitalized relationship. This marks a return to distrusting America and an increased reliance on Russia, characterized by a flurry of high-level meetings and previously undisclosed military purchases and partnerships.
The evidence reviewed includes Vietnam’s orders for numerous sophisticated air-defense systems, advanced upgrades for its submarines, and requests for entirely new fleets of aircraft. Furthermore, Russia and Vietnam have continued to strengthen their military-technical collaboration through various joint ventures. At least one company in Hanoi, Vietnam’s capital, found itself added to US and European sanctions and export-control lists in 2024 and 2025, indicating its involvement in supporting Russia’s conflict against Ukraine.
Most of these transactions and collaborations with Russia have successfully evaded sanctions enforcement, partly due to covert payment systems facilitated by other companies, and partly because the United States, in its belief of being Vietnam’s preferred partner, overlooked many of these dealings. However, Moscow is becoming increasingly assertive. While many of these secret purchases began during the Biden administration, they appear to be accelerating under President Trump’s tenure, alongside more public displays of their deepening relationship.
Last month, Russia’s state news agency announced a newly ratified agreement with Vietnam that would allow payments for military equipment to be made in Russian rubles.
“The law was signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin,” a Russian statement confirmed.
Vietnamese officials maintain that their approach is purely pragmatic. Russia has been their primary weapons supplier for decades, and diversifying their defense sources requires time. However, following a brief pause after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – and an initial push towards other partners, which the Biden administration had encouraged – Vietnam is now re-engaging with Moscow in ways that could significantly alter security calculations across Asia.
A growing concern across much of the region is that President Trump, slated to attend the APEC summit meetings in South Korea this week, is inadvertently pushing Hanoi further away from the US. This, many fear, is making Asia a more volatile place by alienating not only traditional allies but also newer partners.
A US Air Force C-130 transport plane was showcased during the Vietnam International Defense Expo in Hanoi last December.
The groundbreaking ceremony for a new Trump hotel and golf course development in Vietnam took place in May. This project has sparked considerable anger among local residents due to land seizures.
Frustration with the United States has steadily mounted in Vietnam. This sentiment has grown with the cessation of American aid for clean energy and HIV prevention, inconsistent tariffs, a perceived lack of interest in high-level leader-to-leader meetings, a Trump family golf development near Hanoi that has deeply angered local communities, and unexpected measures like new taxes on US furniture imports—a critical industry for Vietnam’s economic growth.
Fifty years have passed since the war with America concluded, yet Vietnam remains a nation grappling with internal divisions—factions that either distrust or welcome Western influence. According to analysts and officials, President Trump’s current actions are inadvertently bolstering America skeptics and alienating those who favor closer ties with the US.
Towards the end of the Biden administration, Vietnam was wary of appearing too closely aligned with the United States. Now, in private discussions, Vietnamese leaders have conveyed their shock at what they perceive as a confusing and unjust shift under the Trump administration, a shift that disregards Vietnam’s commitment to a comprehensive strategic partnership with the US.
“The unpredictability of Trump’s policies has made Vietnam very skeptical about dealing with the United States,” stated Nguyen The Phuong, a security analyst at the University of New South Wales in Australia. “It’s not only trade but the difficulty of reading his mind and actions.”
New Alignments
Vietnam consistently asserts that its relationship with the United States remains robust. Anna Kelly, a White House spokeswoman, highlighted the benefits for the American people.
“Under President Trump’s leadership, the United States has a great relationship with Vietnam,” she affirmed in response to queries, “which is how the President was able to open Vietnamese markets to American goods.”
However, in Japan, South Korea, Australia, and within American foreign policy institutions, concern over potentially losing Vietnam continues to intensify.
Russia is not the only source of apprehension. Vietnam’s leader, To Lam, recently visited North Korea and agreed to defense cooperation. Just days after President Trump imposed “liberation day” tariffs, slapping a 46 percent duty on Vietnamese exports (a figure later reduced), China’s leader, Xi Jinping, received a ceremonial welcome in Hanoi. Subsequently, Vietnam fast-tracked plans for three cross-border railway projects that Beijing had long advocated.
China’s premier, Li Qiang, is seen at the center, alongside Kim Jong-un of North Korea and To Lam of Vietnam. This photograph, distributed by a Russian state media agency, captures a commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the North Korea’s Workers’ Party held this month in Pyongyang.
Mr. Lam and Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, at the Presidential Palace in April. Amid unexpected U.S. tariffs, observers have noted Vietnam’s increased leaning towards Russia and China.
Vietnam possesses a rich history of independence and a post-Cold War stance of neutrality. Yet, officials from the region’s democracies now worry that Hanoi is fostering a surge in “red nationalism” throughout society and is veering away from its traditional strategy of balancing global powers.
Any alignment or leverage that might encourage Hanoi to side with China, Russia, or North Korea in disputes could prompt other partners to withdraw. South Korea and Japan are the largest foreign investors in Vietnam. Tokyo, for example, is building coast guard patrol boats for Vietnam, hoping these vessels will assist in monitoring and countering Chinese assertiveness in Asian sea lanes.
In certain circles in Washington, too, Vietnam’s foreign policy choices are drawing increased scrutiny. A congressional official disclosed that this year, Congress received a classified briefing on Vietnam’s military acquisitions and upgrades to its naval and air defenses.
This served as an early indicator of escalating concern regarding the potential repercussions of American disengagement in Asia.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is slated for his inaugural official visit to Vietnam in early November. Several Vietnamese and American officials, speaking anonymously due to the sensitive nature of the topic, expressed hope that these discussions could revitalize the bilateral relationship, or at the very least, halt its further deterioration.
Alongside addressing lingering war legacy issues, such as unexploded ordnance, potential defense purchases are expected to be on the agenda. Three Vietnamese officials confirmed that the C-130 transport planes are once again under consideration. Vietnam has also shown interest in co-producing unmanned drones, a vital asset for the outposts it is fortifying in the South China Sea to challenge Beijing’s claims over disputed waterways and the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
Vietnam’s Air Defense and Air Force commander, Maj. Gen. Vu Hong Son, confirmed in an essay last month that substantial military acquisitions were imminent. These include “trainer aircraft, fighter jets, missile systems, antiaircraft guns and new-generation radar systems.”
He refrained from specifying the origin of this new hardware.
Some diversification has already begun. Vietnam has initiated domestic weapons production and secured modest defense agreements with nations like Israel and India, among others.
While Russia remains its primary arms supplier, Vietnam is increasingly diversifying its defense capabilities with its own indigenous designs. Vietnamese-made TLDK-35 surface-to-air missiles were prominently displayed at the Hanoi exhibition in September.
Drones developed in Vietnam were also prominently featured during the National Day parade.
However, Vietnam has largely reverted to relying on Russia. When President Putin visited in June 2024—his first trip to Asia since 2018—he was accompanied by the head of Rosoboronexport, the Russian state arms exporting company. By this time, Vietnam had already made clandestine arrangements to acquire Russian weaponry through a covert payment system routed via an oil and gas joint venture, as revealed in a 2023 document from Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance.
Vietnam was attempting to maintain a balanced approach. The United States anticipated the next move would be C-130s. However, that deal stalled, while Russia’s continued to advance.
Documents from another Russian defense exporter, leaked last month by the pro-Ukrainian hacker group black8mirror, indicate that Vietnam was scheduled to receive nine electronic warfare systems in 2024 for Russia’s Su-35, a highly agile Sukhoi fighter jet. Additionally, 26 components for mobile ground-based systems capable of jamming radar-guided missiles were slated for delivery in 2025, with a reported cost of $189,739,535.
Records from the company, Rostec, also detail Vietnam’s inquiries about new “anti-submarine helicopters” and advanced periscopes for its submarine fleet.
These previously unreported air-defense orders led analysts, who verified the documents as a credible insight into Vietnam’s plans, to conclude that a deal for Su-35s and other aircraft was likely already finalized. One of several Vietnamese officials who confirmed substantial orders from Russia indicated that the country acquired 40 new Su-35 and Su-30 fighter jets, part of an $8 billion agreement, though deliveries are experiencing delays as Moscow prioritizes its own war efforts and other international commitments.
“The Russians have demonstrated considerable skill in finding workarounds, including facilitating defense exports through third-party countries,” noted Ian Storey, author of “Putin’s Russia and Southeast Asia: The Kremlin’s Pivot to Asia and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War.”
President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has steadily drawn Vietnam closer to Moscow, exemplified by his official visit to Hanoi in 2024.
The Russian Rosoboronexport stand at Vietnam’s military expo in 2024.
For the United States, however, closer military collaborations and the much-discussed sale of F-16 fighter jets have yet to materialize.
“Trump is the critical factor,” said Mr. Phuong, the Australian security analyst whose Ph.D. focused on Vietnam’s military. “An official informed me that if a naval conflict were to erupt between Vietnam and China, and if Vietnam had purchased F-16s from the United States, and if Trump believed he could secure a concession with China, then the United States would prohibit Vietnam from using those F-16s.”
Disruption Ahead
Vietnam’s concerns haven’t stopped it from trying to curry favor with Mr. Trump. One such effort involved fast-tracking the Trump Organization’s golf complex, a project that generated $5 million for the president, as financial records indicate. Hanoi has also pledged to increase purchases from the United States and to prevent China from illicitly rerouting exports through Vietnam to circumvent U.S. tariffs.
This vibrant nation of 100 million people exports nearly a third of its total production to America, and above all, Hanoi craves stability and predictability in trade relations.
Even before Mr. Trump’s re-election last autumn, Mr. Lam had sought a meeting, but to no avail. Hanoi’s trade negotiators are also urgently seeking clarification on new “country of origin” regulations and future industry-specific tariffs, details conspicuously absent from the trade announcements released this weekend, coinciding with Mr. Trump’s arrival in Asia.
“Trump’s approach is like an ongoing reality show—more ‘deals’ or further tariff hikes are almost certainly on the horizon,” observed Stephen Olsen, a former U.S. trade negotiator and currently a senior fellow at the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.
Russia, meanwhile, has been quick to capitalize on this growing estrangement.
President Putin extended an invitation to Mr. Lam and his wife, hosting them in Moscow in May. On September 2, Russian troops marched alongside Vietnamese regiments in Hanoi for National Day, a spectacle that, according to Vietnamese state media, underscored “the pivotal role of defense cooperation.” Just two weeks later, one of Mr. Putin’s closest advisors, Nikolai Patrusev, visited Hanoi to discuss maritime security.
Russian soldiers participated in Vietnam’s National Day parade in September, symbolizing a renewed era of defense cooperation.
This constant exchange of diplomacy and military displays suggests that for Mr. Putin, Asia offers a strategic arena to disrupt both American and Chinese initiatives, and to refute the narrative that their rivalry is the sole defining factor in global power dynamics.
“Russia under Putin aspires to be an independent great power,” commented Michael A. McFaul, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, “not merely a junior partner in the autocratic world.”
Beijing appears largely unperturbed, publicly maintaining a subdued stance while still orchestrating dramatic showcases of its own influence.
This year, Chinese troops marched in Vietnamese military parades in both Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi—a poignant sight in a country that endured 1,000 years of Chinese domination. Vietnam, Russia, and North Korea all dispatched high-level delegations to Beijing for China’s own extravagant military parade.
Mr. McFaul noted that in his interactions with Chinese experts on Russia, their strong nationalist pride seems to diminish any significant anxiety regarding Mr. Putin.
“They don’t view Russia as a truly great country,” he remarked. “They perceive them as a group of common people. The Chinese possess a deep sense of their own historical significance, believing, ‘We’ve been a great power for thousands of years, and we are once again, while these Russians are merely on the fringes of the global system.'”
However, as has been its custom for a long time, Vietnam intends to adopt a long-term perspective. For its leaders, current shifts in influence do not necessarily dictate the course of future events.
As Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam’s revered nationalist leader, famously stated in 1966: “Everything hinges on the Americans. Should they wish to wage war for twenty years, then we shall endure war for twenty years. If they desire peace, we shall embrace peace and afterward, invite them for tea.”
A statue of Ho Chi Minh stands at Vietnam’s National Day commemoration in September.
Reporting was contributed by Tung Ngo from Hanoi, Vietnam; Eric Schmitt from Washington; Anton Troianovski from Berlin; and Oleg Matsnev from Munich.