In an insightful interview with The Hindu, T.S. Tirumurti, India’s former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the U.N. in New York, delves into the complex foreign policy challenges and opportunities India faces in today’s unpredictable world. He discusses the nation’s pivotal relationships with China, the U.S., and Russia, offering a seasoned perspective on navigating global dynamics. Here are edited excerpts from his illuminating conversation:
What are your thoughts on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to China for the SCO summit? Can we truly say India and China are settling into a ‘new normal’ despite ongoing differences?
I believe we are still quite far from establishing a ‘new normal’ in our relationship with China. While both sides have indicated a willingness to progress, and we’ve taken some important, though largely symbolic, initial steps like resuming air links, the Kailash-Manasarovar yatra, and liberalizing visa policies, significant issues remain. We still need to tackle larger concerns such as the trade imbalance, market access for Indian goods and services, de-escalation tactics and “early harvest” agreements on border disputes, and the construction of their largest dam near our border on the Brahmaputra.
Furthermore, China’s renewed activity in our neighborhood, including its crucial support for Pakistan during Operation Sindoor and efforts to encircle India, highlights these challenges. For the first time, India shares a border with a superpower, fundamentally altering our relationship. The old frameworks are insufficient to manage China in both its roles as a neighbor and a global power. Therefore, much more effort is needed to rebuild trust before we can genuinely reach a new normal. Currently, our ties with China are heavily securitized, which hinders progress.
Some suggest that global upheavals since Donald Trump’s presidency have brought India and China closer. Do you believe U.S. tariffs and trade policies are influencing India’s approach to China, or is India’s policy independent of U.S. pressure?
While it’s true that President Trump’s actions disrupted the trajectory of India-U.S. relations, I doubt that American tariffs pushed us significantly closer to China. Both India and China realized that the prolonged border standoff was becoming counterproductive. Consequently, we made a slight retreat in October 2024 and initiated some symbolic steps. However, our actions at Tianjin served to demonstrate to the U.S. that India has other options and can manage its differences with China, implying we should not be taken for granted. The actual weight of these options is debatable, given the deeper systemic issues we face with China. That said, while countering China where necessary, we should also explore areas of common interest. Neither country is doing enough to find synergy on regional, plurilateral, or global issues.
This leads us to the turbulent U.S.-India relationship, marked by 50% tariffs, trade disagreements, and public criticism from the U.S. How do you interpret these developments?
The U.S. must first clarify India’s role in its strategic vision. Secondly, it needs to ensure that our relationship isn’t subjected to a “trial by fire” with every new episode. You’ll notice that the countries that have conceded to U.S. tariff threats, like the European Union, Japan, and South Korea, are America’s closest allies. They paid that price to preserve their alliances, which they perceive as crucial for their standing in the liberal world order. The current challenge to this order originates from within, specifically from the U.S. itself. However, when the U.S. employs similar tactics with non-allies like India, it doesn’t yield the same results. That’s because India is committed to maintaining its relations with the U.S., but not at any cost.
Furthermore, public shaming and naming do not work well with Indian leadership, as we saw with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Nixon. The U.S. cozying up to Pakistan after Operation Sindoor further complicated matters. Levying punitive tariffs for purchasing Russian oil introduces an entirely extraneous geopolitical element into a trade issue. The U.S. is also reportedly urging the EU and G7 to impose 100% tariffs on India and China. We are also keenly observing how the U.S.-China deal will impact the Indo-Pacific and our geopolitical interests, which will, in turn, affect initiatives like the QUAD. I am confident that both India and the U.S. recognize the value of our partnership, which is why trade negotiations are resuming. With the U.S. requesting NATO countries to cease Russian oil purchases, perhaps the threat of punitive tariffs over us will finally recede.
Tensions in Indo-U.S. relations also spotlight India’s ties with Russia. With no end in sight for the Ukraine war, India’s stance draws significant criticism from the U.S. How do you evaluate India’s Ukraine policy?
I firmly believe that our decision in 2022 to abstain from U.N. Security Council resolutions on Ukraine and advocate for a return to diplomacy—addressing the legitimate interests of all parties—was correct. However, I have consistently argued, including in my writings, that India should take a more active role on the Ukraine front, even as a tactical move to mitigate criticism.
This doesn’t imply mediation but rather active engagement, particularly given the West’s discontent with our position. I’ve highlighted India’s active involvement in the Korean War within the U.N. Security Council between 1951 and 1952, which led to our chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Committee after the armistice. Operation Sindoor underscores that if we expect greater engagement from our partners on our conflicts, we must also engage more with theirs, especially when geopolitics increasingly dictates economic and technological outcomes. Observing the current discussions between India and the EU, France, Russia, and the U.S., I only wish we had pursued this earlier.
West Asia is another flashpoint. Unlike most other Global South nations, India has avoided strong criticism of Israel regarding Gaza but joined SCO and BRICS members in condemning Israel’s actions in Iran. What explains these differing positions?
I’m unsure if the Global South has truly been vocal or influential regarding the Gaza conflict. Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have largely remained on the sidelines, prioritizing the removal of the threat from Iran and its proxies—an objective largely achieved by Israel. These Gulf nations also seek to normalize relations with Israel, facilitated by the U.S. through the Abraham Accords. You saw how they welcomed President Trump without pressing him to halt the Gaza war. India viewed these developments as vindicating its pro-Israeli leaning, given our close bilateral ties with Israel. However, with the widespread devastation in Gaza and the rapid deterioration in the West Bank, our position is becoming increasingly untenable. While we may not wish to outpace the Gulf and Arab world on the Palestine issue, India has substantial interests in the region, though these may not always align with theirs. Let us hope that our recent, more balanced articulation translates into a more active Indian engagement in West Asia.
Critics suggest India’s policy of “strategic autonomy” is strained amid the U.S.–China rivalry and the Ukraine war. Do you believe strategic autonomy still serves India well, or does it need redefinition?
Strategic autonomy has historically worked for India, from Prime Minister Nehru’s non-alignment during the Cold War—where we refused to join either the U.S. or Soviet blocs—to today’s multi-alignment, where we engage with both the U.S. and China. It has consistently provided us the freedom for independent decision-making. Imagine if we were an “ally” of either the U.S. or China now; we would be struggling within their embrace. Furthermore, for a major power like us, strategic autonomy is the pathway to emerging as a potential pole in an evolving multipolar world. It also represents leadership—demonstrating to the world an alternative path beyond joining one of two major camps, just as our non-aligned stance did for the developing world decades ago.
How do you view the shifts in the global order? What guiding principles should shape India’s foreign policy during these uncertain times?
The global order is undoubtedly experiencing significant disruptions. On one hand, conflicts are tearing nations apart, and international law is being violated with impunity. On the other hand, urgent global challenges such as climate change, energy security, pandemics, AI, digital issues, and cyber threats compel these very same countries to cooperate. This is the inherent irony. The point at which these two opposing forces converge will determine the future trajectory of the global order. We should also avoid excessive nostalgia for a world order that we neither shaped nor genuinely benefited from, even if we learned to navigate it to our advantage against considerable odds. A prime example is our rise as a nuclear power, where every conceivable obstacle, including sanctions, was placed in our path, yet we overcame them.
We have never been proponents of the status quo, always advocating for meaningful reform in institutions like the U.N. Security Council and other 1945-era structures such as the World Bank, IMF, or WTO. Moving forward, as a rising power, we must be proactive. We have been exemplary in contributing to global commons, whether through “vaccine maitri” during COVID-19 or combating climate change. However, the world now expects us to play a more significant role in conflicts and geopolitics. We can no longer simply keep our heads down, mind our own business, and expect to become the third-largest economy or achieve “Viksit Bharat” by 2047. That approach is obsolete. We need to get our geopolitics right.
This interview provides vital insight into India’s thoughtful and pragmatic approach to foreign relations, emphasizing its commitment to sovereign decision-making in an increasingly complex world.