In a surprising turn of events last September, the youth wing of an Islamist political party in Bangladesh achieved a decisive victory in student elections at the University of Dhaka, a hub historically associated with left-liberal thought and the birthplace of the pivotal 2024 student revolution.
This win served as an early indicator that a new political force was emerging in Bangladesh. For decades, the nation’s governance had largely been dominated by two established dynastic political parties since gaining independence in 1971.
The Jamaat-e-Islami party solidified its unexpected ascent in the recent national elections, the first held since the 2024 student-led uprising that overthrew Sheikh Hasina’s autocratic government. While Tarique Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (B.N.P.) secured a clear majority and is poised to lead, Jamaat made significant gains, winning 68 out of 297 seats – a far greater number than ever before.
Just two months prior, Jamaat had further surprised observers by forming an alliance with the National Citizen Party (N.C.P.), a group established in 2025 by the very leaders of the student uprising. This alliance raised eyebrows due to Jamaat’s core tenet of women’s public life being guided by Islamic principles, which sharply contrasted with the N.C.P.’s vision for an inclusive democracy with robust political freedoms and women’s rights.
The emergence of this new political dynamic underscores the profound shifts brought about by the student movement, though not entirely in the direction the students had envisioned. The N.C.P. justified its electoral alliance with Jamaat as a strategic move to increase its chances of winning seats, leveraging Jamaat’s extensive student network.
Ultimately, the N.C.P. managed to secure only six of the 30 seats it contested.
However, the students who spearheaded the 2024 revolution also celebrated a distinct victory. In a parallel referendum held the same day, voters overwhelmingly approved constitutional reforms aimed at strengthening democracy and preventing future authoritarian rule. These reforms include the establishment of a bicameral legislature and the introduction of term limits for prime ministers.
Despite these significant achievements, some analysts believe the student movement may struggle to maintain its momentum. Mujibur Rehman, a political scientist at Jamia Millia Islamia University in Delhi, drew parallels to the 2011 Arab Spring, which saw governments overthrown but failed to leave a lasting political legacy. He noted that student groups often lack the political experience needed for long-term sustainability beyond campus activism, especially in regions characterized by patronage politics like South Asia.
Dr. Rehman suggested that the alliance with Jamaat, whose youth wing, Bangladesh Islami Chhatrashibir, had swept university elections in four major Bangladeshi schools, was an attempt by student leaders to secure a political foothold.
This ‘marriage of convenience’ granted Jamaat the political visibility it had sought for decades, allowing it to present a more moderate image. Founded in 1941 and influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat had been marginalized in Bangladeshi politics since its support for Pakistan during the nation’s bloody independence struggle.
Although it previously gained some ground under B.N.P. governments, even holding cabinet posts and winning 18 seats in the 1991 general election, it largely operated as an underground movement, particularly suppressed during Ms. Hasina’s 15-year rule.
However, Jamaat continued its grassroots efforts, attracting supporters disaffected with traditional dynastic politics, especially among younger generations. Mosques and madrassas served as key centers for their outreach, and historical events also played into their favor.
Iftekharuzzaman, executive director of Transparency International Bangladesh, who played a role in shaping Bangladesh’s post-2024 reform agenda, pointed to the ‘post-9/11 syndrome’ — which contributed to a global demonization of Muslims — and the rise of the right-wing Hindutva movement in India as factors that drew more people to Jamaat’s cause. “Hindutva’s implication in Bangladesh and 9/11’s implication in Bangladesh is the same result,” he stated. Jamaat’s strongest electoral performances were in regions bordering India, such as Khulna and Rajshahi. Pervasive corruption and a lack of employment opportunities further fueled public discontent, making Jamaat an appealing ‘alternative’. He also noted Jamaat benefited from the absence of the Awami League, previously Bangladesh’s largest party, which was barred from participating in the election.
Meghmallar Bosu, a student activist from Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, expressed a profound sense of insecurity and ‘political marginalization’ in the 18 months following the revolution. Ahead of the election, he indicated a preference to vote for a candidate likely to defeat an Islamist, reflecting the concerns many had amidst the participation of over 50 parties, including numerous far-right Islamist groups like Islami Andolan Bangladesh.
The student demonstrations, which began in July 2024, initially focused on protesting job reservation systems. However, a military crackdown ordered by Ms. Hasina transformed them into a widespread movement against authoritarianism, ultimately leading to her resignation and flight to India.
Hundreds of students, supported by both the B.N.P. and Jamaat, joined these protests, as each party saw an opportunity to unseat the Awami League and advance their own objectives. Yet, once the initial fervor subsided, the ambitious task of formulating proposals to reconstruct the nation, as envisioned by student leaders, became entangled in political disputes and lengthy negotiations.
The B.N.P., Jamaat, and other smaller parties opposed many of the original recommendations put forth by 11 reform commissions established by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, who served as the chief adviser to the interim government.
In April, the Women’s Affairs Reform Commission presented a series of proposals, including equal inheritance rights for women, increased political representation, and the recognition of sex work as a legitimate profession.
Shafiqur Rahman, Jamaat’s leader, publicly rejected the commission and its recommendations. Earlier this month, he controversially likened women working to prostitution in a social media post, which his office later claimed was the result of a hacked account and subsequently removed.
The N.C.P.’s decision to ally with Jamaat deeply angered many female protesters and leaders, who viewed it as a betrayal of their core principles.
Taposhi Rabeya, a student activist, lamented, “The youth had upheld their faith that N.C.P. would be the political party that was pro-people.” However, she added, after aligning with Jamaat, “they could not uphold their ideology.”
Leaders of the student party maintained that their alliance was purely strategic, not ideological. Saleh Uddin Sifat, a senior N.C.P. leader, explained that establishing a grassroots network in less than a year was impossible, making an alliance necessary. “And then we looked at who is more pro reform,” Sifat said, acknowledging reservations but concluding, “We saw Jamaat is more pro-reform here, and then we joined them.”