The recent cancellation of a proposed US-Russia summit in Budapest, aimed at addressing the conflict in Ukraine, marked a significant setback. This diplomatic breakdown was swiftly followed by the Trump administration’s decision to impose new sanctions on Russia.
In response, President Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s successful testing of two formidable nuclear-capable weapons. These advanced armaments are reportedly designed for potential ‘doomsday combat’ against the United States.
Experts suggest the timing of these events is likely no accident. Putin’s message is unmistakable: facing Russia’s potent nuclear capabilities, the United States must eventually acknowledge Moscow’s strength and engage in dialogue, regardless of its preferences.
This strategy of brinkmanship echoes Cold War tactics, where the Soviet Union consistently stressed that negotiation was an imperative, not a choice, for the world’s leading nuclear powers. More recently, Moscow has argued that efforts to isolate it—such as the latest US sanctions targeting Russian oil producers—are ultimately ineffective.
András Rácz, a senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, interprets this as a clear declaration: ‘You cannot simply impose sanctions on us as you wish; we are a significant nuclear power, and you must come to the negotiating table.’
President Trump began his term this year focused on resolving the war in Ukraine. However, Moscow has consistently attempted to broaden these discussions to include economic, energy, and nuclear issues, aiming for a ‘package deal’ more favorable to its interests. These efforts have so far been unsuccessful.
‘Nuclear weaponry remains the only domain where Russia approaches parity with the United States,’ Rácz explains. ‘Therefore, to gain leverage, they must integrate the nuclear question in the package deal. This mirrors the Soviet era, when their nuclear arsenal, not their economy, served as their primary bargaining tool against the much larger US economy.’
Despite the Kremlin’s attempts, these broader negotiations have not materialized. President Trump has indicated he will not pursue business or energy agreements until the Ukraine conflict concludes. Yet, nuclear issues persist as a potential avenue for Moscow to compel Washington’s engagement.
Last September, Putin put forward a proposal for Russia and the United States to extend existing limits on long-range nuclear weapons by one year, starting in February 2026. President Trump publicly supported this idea, calling it ‘good.’
This week, Putin again highlighted new weapons systems first revealed in 2018. These armaments are specifically designed to bypass US missile defenses, thereby preserving Russia’s capacity for mutually assured destruction against the United States, irrespective of any ‘Golden Dome’ missile shield enhancements proposed by President Trump.
Over the past week, Putin disclosed details of two recent tests: the Burevestnik, a low-flying, nuclear-propelled cruise missile tested on October 21st, and the Poseidon, a long-range, nuclear-powered underwater drone, tested on Wednesday. Both are designed to carry nuclear warheads.
It’s possible these tests were scheduled independently, prior to the recent downturn in US-Russia relations.
Pavel Podvig, director of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project in Geneva, believes these tests are likely unrelated to current political events. He pointed out that Putin chose not to issue direct threats to the United States when announcing the results.
Russia’s nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile was launched in Russian territory, in 2018, in this handout still image from video footage made available by the Russian Defense Ministry.
Despite their advanced nature, these new weapons do not fundamentally alter the strategic nuclear balance between the two global powers.
James M. Acton, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, emphasizes that ‘Russia has possessed the capability to destroy the United States with nuclear weapons since the mid-1960s. This mutual vulnerability is a permanent reality, not a variable choice.’
He added that Russia’s development of new methods to achieve this destruction should not cause any more alarm than the existing nuclear balance already does.
Nevertheless, the design of the Burevestnik and Poseidon, both powered by nuclear reactors, is especially concerning. The Burevestnik, in particular, has earned the ominous moniker ‘flying Chernobyl,’ recalling the 1986 Soviet nuclear disaster. A failed test of this weapon in 2019 near Russia’s northern coast resulted in nuclear contamination and fatalities.
The inherent risk of nuclear contamination from such weapons might be a deliberate tactic to pressure Western leaders into dialogue. Rácz describes this as a ‘madman strategy,’ where nations develop catastrophic weapons and feign readiness to deploy them.
Vladimir Dzhabarov, deputy chairman of Russia’s parliamentary international affairs committee, stated in a recent interview that these tests clearly signal to Western leaders the necessity of engaging with Moscow.
‘We aimed to show a willingness to negotiate with the West, to de-escalate what had become an endless confrontation, and to foster mutual understanding,’ Dzhabarov explained. He asserted that with weapons like the Burevestnik, Russia gains an ‘invincible’ status.
He further referenced the Kremlin’s pre-Ukraine invasion demands, suggesting that the presence of weapons like the Burevestnik would compel the West to finally consider Russia’s long-standing arguments.
It remains uncertain whether Washington fully grasped Moscow’s intent. Following Putin’s announcements, President Trump publicly declared that the U.S. would resume nuclear weapons testing ‘on an equal basis,’ sparking debate about the first American nuclear warhead explosion since 1992.
However, Putin’s recent statements concerned the testing of delivery systems for nuclear warheads, not the detonation of warheads themselves. Russia’s last nuclear warhead test was in 1990.