Behind the Scenes: How U.S. and Arab Nations Forged the Gaza Peace Deal

Picture this: a tense negotiation room for the Gaza cease-fire, where the Egyptian intelligence chief is giving an update. Suddenly, the Qatari prime minister discreetly passes a handwritten note to Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff.

That note? It was a direct plea for the two American envoys to pressure the Israelis into making crucial compromises.

This pivotal moment unfolded on the morning of Wednesday, October 8th. Jared Kushner, President Trump’s son-in-law, and Steve Witkoff, the U.S. special envoy for the Middle East, had just landed in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. Their mission: to achieve a long-awaited breakthrough in negotiations aimed at concluding Israel’s two-year conflict with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Optimism was high. For the first time, Hamas indicated a willingness to release all Israeli hostages without demanding a full Israeli military withdrawal, provided they received guarantees that Israel would not resume hostilities. This concession on hostages could remove a key justification for Israel to continue fighting. In return, Israel was prepared to release thousands of Palestinian prisoners, including 250 individuals serving life sentences.

Despite the positive signs, negotiations had stalled.

For two days, negotiators at the resort town’s convention center had deliberately avoided a contentious issue: the precise amount of territory the Israeli military would vacate in Gaza prior to the exchange of hostages and prisoners. They worried that delving into geographical specifics might completely collapse the fragile discussions.

This detailed report is compiled from interviews with 15 officials from the U.S., Israeli, and various Arab governments. All sources were directly involved in or thoroughly briefed on the negotiations and requested anonymity due to the sensitive nature of these private diplomatic discussions.

Both sides had previously held extreme positions. Hamas demanded a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, with the exception of a small buffer zone along the border. Conversely, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to maintain Israeli troop presence in several Gaza cities, aiming to signal to his constituents and hawkish ministers that he was making minimal concessions.

Closing this significant divide last Wednesday demanded consistent American pressure on Israel’s chief negotiator, Ron Dermer, as highlighted by the Qatari premier’s note. U.S. officials also revealed that President Trump himself made three direct calls to the mediators.

Neither Mr. Dermer’s office nor Hamas responded to requests for comment regarding these discussions.

Ultimately, the two factions reached a compromise, effectively “splitting the difference,” according to Arab officials. Israel would retain control over a larger portion of territory than Hamas desired, but would withdraw from numerous urban areas.

Reluctantly, Hamas accepted this compromise, as confirmed by both Arab and Israeli officials.

Mediators understood that a successful agreement hinged on addressing the more immediate concerns of a cease-fire, hostage release, and prisoner exchange. Pursuing a comprehensive deal involving Israel’s complete withdrawal from Gaza and Hamas’s disarmament was deemed far less achievable at this stage.

The breakthrough in Wednesday’s talks, contrasting with previous failed attempts, underscored a crucial point: with sufficient pressure, even formidable obstacles could be surmounted or strategically postponed. Historically, both parties had rigidly adhered to maximalist demands: Israel sought “total victory,” while Hamas insisted on a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

A recurring frustration among mediators in earlier rounds was Israel’s negotiating team often lacked a clear mandate from Prime Minister Netanyahu to finalize an agreement.

However, this time, both Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s chief negotiator, and Mr. Dermer arrived with explicit authority to strike a deal, according to both Arab and Israeli officials.

These negotiations were the peak of weeks of intense diplomatic efforts, sparked by the controversy surrounding Israel’s failed strike against Hamas officials in Qatar. By late September, President Trump unveiled a 20-point peace plan. Though light on specifics, it clearly outlined the exchange of all hostages for an Israeli military pullback from Gaza.

A critical turning point came on October 3rd, when Mr. Trump publicly endorsed Hamas’s statement regarding his Gaza plan, despite it only backing the hostage and prisoner exchange aspects. Simultaneously, he conveyed a strong message to Israel: cooperate with his peace initiative or face his displeasure.

The ill-fated Israeli strike in Qatar inadvertently created an opportunity for such leverage. A senior U.S. administration official noted that Trump’s consistent long-term support for Netanyahu ultimately empowered him to guide the Israeli leader towards an agreement. This unwavering backing assured Netanyahu that Trump would not demand actions detrimental to Israeli security.

Hamas, on the other hand, had been significantly weakened by two years of sustained Israeli military operations. The militant group also faced growing pressure from across the Arab and Muslim world, including from its vital patron, Turkey, whose intelligence chief was involved in the negotiations. Arab officials stated that Hamas seriously considered the consequence of undermining Trump’s plan: it would grant Israel a clear mandate from Washington to escalate its attacks on Gaza.

Historically, Hamas had always held onto Israeli hostages as a bargaining chip, demanding a complete Israeli withdrawal and an end to the war. However, senior U.S. officials revealed that the group eventually concluded that holding the hostages inadvertently provided Israel with ongoing justification for its military campaign.

“They were almost looking at the hostages less as an asset and more as a liability,” observed Mr. Witkoff.

As Wednesday afternoon progressed in Sharm el-Sheikh, mediators shuttling between the Israeli and Hamas delegations sensed they were finally on the verge of a breakthrough.

Thanks to sustained pressure from Mr. Witkoff and Mr. Kushner, Israel became more receptive to a middle-ground solution regarding withdrawal. Israeli negotiators ultimately reasoned that by relinquishing control of half of Gaza, they could retain the other half as leverage for future talks concerning post-war governance, as reported by Israeli and Arab officials.

Mr. al-Hayya, who had recently survived an Israeli assassination attempt in Doha, requested time to consult with other Hamas leaders. A convoy of black SUVs transported him and three other militant group officials back to their compound, according to Arab officials.

Their absence extended for so long that the Qatari prime minister dispatched a senior aide, Abdulla al-Slaiti, to locate them at their residence.

It wasn’t until 10 p.m. — five hours after leaving the negotiation table — that Mr. al-Hayya was prepared to communicate Hamas’s decision to the mediators.

By this time, the Israeli, American, Turkish, Qatari, and Egyptian teams had already retired to their villas within the expansive Four Seasons resort in Sharm el-Sheikh. According to officials, the Qatari prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Egyptian intelligence chief, General Hassan Rashad, were together in General Rashad’s villa when Mr. al-Hayya finally arrived.

Mr. al-Hayya informed the mediators that despite Hamas viewing the deal as unjust, their primary objective was to halt Israeli airstrikes in Gaza. He also expressed Hamas’s hope that the mediators would continue striving to secure better terms for Palestinians.

Despite being veiled in an expression of discontent, Mr. al-Hayya’s response was unequivocally an acceptance.

Both Sheikh Mohammed Al Thani and General Rashad felt a growing sense that the prolonged conflict between Israelis and Palestinians was finally approaching a conclusion. Moments later, Mr. Witkoff and Mr. Kushner arrived at General Rashad’s villa to confirm the positive news, promptly relaying it to the White House, as reported by Arab officials.

During this period, Mr. Witkoff held a brief, unusual meeting with Mr. al-Hayya, assuring him that the United States would guarantee Israel’s adherence to its commitments, provided Hamas honored its own pledges, officials disclosed. This meeting was initially reported by Axios.

A few details, such as the specific Palestinian prisoners Israel would release, remained unsettled. Mediators discussed the timing of a public announcement, but ultimately agreed that these outstanding points were not insurmountable and that President Trump could proceed with announcing the agreement.

Back in Washington, President Trump was hosting an event at the White House when Secretary of State Marco Rubio handed him a note. It read, “Very close. We need you to approve a Truth Social post soon so you can announce deal first.”

With the final text of the agreement meticulously edited by Egyptian and Israeli intelligence officials, Sheikh Mohammed Al Thani signed it first. He then presented an English copy to Mr. Dermer and, separately, an Arabic version to Mr. al-Hayya, officials confirmed.

At 1 a.m., an American negotiator answered a call from President Trump, putting him on speakerphone for the room to hear. “It’s a big day,” the president declared.