Even as attempts at a peace agreement struggle to gain traction, the M23 armed group is significantly strengthening its political and economic grip on the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The militia has actively started recruiting its own administrators, implementing tax systems, and training judges, soldiers, and police, effectively building a shadow government that rivals Kinshasa’s authority.
For over three decades, the mineral-rich eastern DRC, which shares a border with Rwanda, has been a hotbed of conflict. The situation escalated dramatically with the M23’s resurgence in 2021—a group reportedly backed by Rwanda and actively fighting the Kinshasa government. The conflict reached a critical point in early 2025 when the militia successfully captured the vital cities of Goma and Bukavu.
Following these conquests, the M23 now governs a vast territory desperately in need of reconstruction. The official government responded by closing banks and most administrative services in the unstable East, leading to a mass exodus of civil servants.
Corneille Nangaa, head of the M23’s political faction, announced in late September 2025 that the group, whose declared objective is to oust President Felix Tshisekedi’s government, intends to ‘establish a new administrative model founded on transparency and efficiency.’
According to experts interviewed by AFP, the M23 aims to demonstrate its governance capabilities to both the Congolese populace and the international community. Within its initial months of control, the group has already appointed provincial governors, mayors, and local administrators, and has started issuing identity cards and other administrative papers.
However, despite these efforts, Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu, have been without traditional police forces or courts for months. Local reports confirm a significant increase in crime rates, while the shutdown of banks and crucial trade routes has exacerbated the region’s severe economic downturn.
A New Order: Police and Legal Professionals
Beginning August 2025, the M23 initiated several significant changes, including unveiling its new police force. This force reportedly comprises former government officers, though it remains ambiguous whether their allegiance was freely given or coerced.
In a clear effort to distinguish itself from the notoriously corrupt national police, M23’s video emphasized the professionalism of its new recruits. The footage displayed officers in riot gear showcasing their capabilities and investigators in overalls diligently practicing crime scene analysis.
Further expanding its parallel system, the group has also conducted recruitment exams for over 500 lawyers, intending to incorporate them into its emerging judiciary.
A July 2025 report by United Nations experts highlighted serious concerns, stating that M23’s imposed governance structures have historically lacked fundamental legal safeguards and accountability, leading to arbitrary punishments and extrajudicial killings.
While widespread arrests of suspected individuals have reportedly lowered crime rates, this has come at the significant cost of numerous human rights abuses, widely condemned by international organizations.
The Lifeline of External Support
The M23 has publicly declared the recruitment of 7,000 newly trained soldiers. However, the effectiveness and loyalty of these troops, many of whom are former Congolese army soldiers captured during M23 offensives in early 2025, are yet to be fully determined. These forces could potentially bolster the armed group’s control over its rear areas, which security sources report are currently facing guerrilla attacks from pro-Kinshasa militias.
The deployment of such a large military force naturally prompts questions regarding the M23’s funding sources, especially in a region devoid of a functional banking system. Reagan Miviri, from the Congolese research institute Ebuteli, emphasized that ‘M23 cannot sustain itself without external support for now, considering the immense funding required for its ongoing military operations.’
To circumvent the absence of banks, the M23 has established its own financial authority to centralize revenue collection. The group has also introduced, or reimposed, various taxes, with a particular focus on trade and mining activities.
For a population already enduring years of regional conflict, many of these taxes are simply unbearable. A civil society activist, speaking anonymously, lamented, ‘We have lost everything because of them, yet they show no hesitation in imposing exorbitant taxes upon us.’
Last month, the primary trade union in South Kivu appealed to the M23 for tax leniency. In a letter reviewed by AFP, the union highlighted the near impossibility for the local populace to meet M23’s tax demands, especially as they are ‘already suffocating’ under the burden of skyrocketing living costs, volatile exchange rates, losses incurred from the war, and frozen savings in government banks.